The strikes came early Wednesday, and they were joint. CENTCOM announced them; Saudi Arabia flew with them. Positions of the Popular Mobilization Forces were hit across seven Iraqi provinces, Baghdad, Wasit, Nineveh, Basra, Kirkuk, Karbala and Diyala, with the PMF reporting at least 20 killed and 32 wounded, among them at least four advisers from Iran's Revolutionary Guard. [1] CENTCOM's account is that it "hit multiple sites in eastern Iraq that were used by Iran to direct drone attacks." [3] The Saudi Defence Ministry's statement was careful: "The Kingdom emphasises that it does not seek escalation but will respond to any aggression it faces." [2]

Iraq's response was the strongest available in diplomatic language and the weakest in effect. The National Security Council called the strikes "a flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty and the sanctity of its lands," and "in contravention of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter." [1] Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi cancelled his first official visit to Saudi Arabia, which had been scheduled for the following day. [1]

Then came the deadline, and its direction is the story. Kataib Hezbollah gave the Iraqi government until August 6 to demonstrate that it can defend Iraq's sovereignty. [1] Not the United States. Not Saudi Arabia. The government in Baghdad, which is being asked to prove within a week that it controls airspace two of the most capable air forces on earth just used freely, by a militia that is itself formally part of Iraq's security apparatus and is separately under pressure to disarm.

One clarification, because the story circulated two ways. A second ultimatum, dated August 7 and attributed to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, appears in none of the primary accounts we could reach. What the Islamic Resistance in Iraq actually said, in the same window, was a denial: it rejected claims of involvement in attacks on Saudi Arabia as "fabrications" and warned that "any foolish Saudi action will be met with a harsh response," with no date attached. [2] One dated ultimatum, from Kataib Hezbollah. One undated threat, from a different group. They have been merged in circulation, and they should not be.

What August 6 actually tests is not Iraqi capability, which is not in question, but the Iraqi state's position between its partners and its militias. Al-Zaidi's government is simultaneously trying to bring armed groups under state control by the end of September and demanding that its allies stop bombing them. Four days from now, one of those groups gets to declare whether he has succeeded.