Numbers this precise usually come from a leak. Amnesty International's are not from one. The organisation reconstructed India's arms exports to Israel out of shipment-level trade data, the routine customs paperwork that follows goods across borders, filtered by the codes that classify what is inside the crate. [1]
The filter is the whole method. Amnesty pulled shipments classified under Harmonised System code 93 and above, which it describes as covering most types of arms and ammunition as well as parts and accessories, together with code 8710 and above, covering armoured fighting and tracked vehicles. [1] Those codes are the internationally standard customs classification, which means the count is in principle reproducible by anyone willing to buy the same trade data.
What Amnesty then removed matters more than what it kept. The organisation says it "systematically excluded data shipments which may have been destined for civilian use" and "also excluded weapons, parts and ammunition that are likely used for anti-missile defence technology." [1] Both exclusions shrink the total. The second one is the notable one: air defence interceptors are among the largest-volume categories in this trade, and cutting them out removes shipments that would have made the number bigger while weakening the moral case. The published figures are therefore a floor.
The floor is 2,596 shipments between 7 October 2023 and 30 November 2025, containing at least 390,516 small arms parts for military-grade weapons, 564,970 parts of explosive ordnance and 298 components of military vehicles. [1] Those three categories total 955,784 items. The period runs 785 days, which works out to about 3.3 shipments a day, or roughly 23 a week, sustained for more than two years.
Amnesty names the companies. On the Indian side it analysed exports from PLR Systems Private Limited, a joint venture of Adani Defence & Aerospace and Israel Weapon Industries; Indo MIM Private Limited; Kalyani Systems Private Limited, a subsidiary of Bharat Forge; the state-owned Munitions India Limited; and Alpha Elsec Defence & Aerospace Systems Private Limited, a joint venture of Alpha Design Technologies and Elbit Systems. [1] The ownership structures are the point Amnesty is pressing. Two of the five are joint ventures with Israeli arms manufacturers and one is owned by the Indian state.
On the receiving end the two published accounts do not match. Amnesty's own release names Elbit Systems, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd and Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. [1] Al Jazeera's account of the same investigation names Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, IMI Systems Limited and MCT Materials. [2] Rafael appears in both. The other four names appear in one account each, and the full report presumably lists more than either summary reproduces. Amnesty's release also refers to writing to "the nine companies named" while enumerating five Indian suppliers in its text, so the total roster is larger than the names either source prints.
Agnes Callamard, Amnesty International's Secretary General, put the state-responsibility argument this way: "India manufactures and supplies arms transferred to Israel through its ownership and control over key supplier companies. Not only has India failed to regulate arms exports to Israel by private companies in line with international law and standards; it has also deepened its defence partnership with Israel." [1]
Her legal conclusion needs to be read as hers. Callamard said that "By knowingly allowing the transfer of arms to Israel, India stands in clear violation of its duty to prevent genocide under the Genocide Convention and its obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions." [1] That is Amnesty International's determination, reached by Amnesty International. No court has ruled that India has violated the Genocide Convention. What a court has said is narrower and is the hinge of Amnesty's knowledge argument: the International Court of Justice issued provisional measures orders recognising a plausible risk of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. [1][2] Callamard's use of it is explicit. "In light of the International Court of Justice's provisional measures orders recognizing a plausible risk of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza," she said, "the Indian authorities cannot credibly argue that they did not know that continuing to authorize and facilitate arms transfers to Israel carries a substantial risk of contributing to serious violations of international law." [1] The claim is about what India could not have failed to know, not about what an Indian shell did.
On India's treaty position, Amnesty records that India abstained on the Arms Trade Treaty in April 2013 and has not signed or acceded since. [1] The organisation says the State of India and the Indian companies supplying the material "must immediately cease all transfers of arms and ammunition, including parts and components, to Israel." [1]
Amnesty also documents its own attempt to get an answer. "In June and July 2026, Amnesty International wrote to the State of India and the nine companies named, detailing the report's findings," the release states. "At the time of publication, no response had been received." [1] Searching for a public Indian government reaction after publication, I found no statement from the Ministry of External Affairs or any Indian ministry addressing the investigation. That is a documented non-response as of a specific date, not proof that the government intends to stay quiet.
Two limits are built into the method and Amnesty does not hide either. Shipment-level trade data establishes what left one country and which company received it. It does not establish where any individual part ended up, which is why Amnesty's framing is risk of complicity rather than a claim that a specific Indian component was fired in a specific strike. The second limit is the calendar. The data stops on 30 November 2025. Whatever has moved between India and Israel in the eight months since is not in this count, in either direction.
